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Abstract
During the past decade, concerns about energy security have reached levels not witnessed in the
developed democracies since the 1970s and early 1980s. In good part because of such concerns,
each of the largest of these countries - Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States has conducted a major review of energy policy, initiated significant policy changes, or both.
Also like the 1970s, recent years have seen a variety of proposals for international cooperation to
promote energy security. That is where the similarities with the past largely end, however. In
contrast to the earlier period, when the principal sources of concern in these countries were high
oil prices and uncertain oil supplies, recent worries about energy security have been much more
diverse. This paper describes these differences and explores their implications. It argues that the
disparities in today’s energy security concerns and policy preferences in the major developed
democracies are due in part to the divergent policies pursued in response to the oil shocks of the
1970s. It also argues that the present differences will make meaningful cooperation by these
countries to promote energy security, which was never easy in the past, yet more difficult.

The Return of Energy Insecurity in the Developed Democracies
The twin oil shocks of the 1970s propelled energy security to the top of the policy agenda
in the developed democracies, but during most of the 1980s and 1990s, the return of low oil
prices and seemingly abundant oil supplies allowed policy makers to focus on other issues.
During the first decade of the 21st century, however, concerns about energy security in these
countries once again reached levels comparable to those fostered by the oil shocks. In good part
because of such concerns, moreover, each of the largest developed democracies – Britain, France,
Germany, Japan, and the United States -- has undertaken a major review of energy policy,
initiated significant policy changes, or both. In addition, as in the 1970s, recent years have seen
proposals for additional efforts at international cooperation to promote energy security, especially
within the International Energy Agency (IEA), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
and the European Union (EU).
That is where the similarities with the past largely end, however. In contrast to the 1970s,
when the principal sources of insecurity in virtually all countries were high oil prices and
uncertainty about oil supplies, recent energy security concerns in the largest developed
democracies have been much more diverse. In the United States, for example, the focus has
continued to be on oil. In France, in contrast, the primary concern has been the need to replace
the country’s aging nuclear power plants. In Germany, worries have centered on the reliability of
foreign natural gas supplies. For its part, Britain has faced the challenges associated with shifting
from being a net exporter to a net importer of oil and gas. As a result of these differences in
energy security concerns, the preferred policy responses of these countries have also been quite
varied.
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Paradoxically, one cause of these differences in recent energy security concerns and
policies was the divergent choices that the major advanced industrialized countries made in
response to the oil shocks. Although they then faced similar challenges regarding the price and
availability of oil, they responded, for a variety of reasons, in distinct ways. Widely varying
efforts were made to increase domestic fossil fuel production, to reduce oil consumption, to
develop alternatives to oil, and to secure and diversify foreign oil supplies, among other things.
These choices in turn resulted in different energy mixes and vulnerabilities in subsequent years.
The recent differences also have important implications for efforts to promote
international cooperation on energy security. In the absence of coercion, international
cooperation requires that states (or other actors) enjoy a minimum degree of shared or
complementary interests and perceptions of the problems they face. While these five countries
have had a common interest in energy security, their specific needs and options have differed
considerably. Thus even in the 1970s, they were able to cooperate to only a very limited extent.
They agreed to maintain strategic petroleum stockpiles and to establish an emergency oil sharing
system within the IEA, but little else of significance. In recent years, the obstacles to meaningful
cooperation among these countries have been even greater. Divergent national concerns and
policy preferences have made and will continue to make collective responses by them yet more
difficult, if not impossible, to orchestrate.
This article focuses on these five developed democracies for three main reasons. First,
Since World War II, they have ranked among the largest consumers and importers of energy. In
1973, at the time of the first oil shock, they accounted for nearly half of global primary energy
demand, and even as recently as 2000, their combined energy use amounted to some 39 percent
of the world total1. Consequently, the energy policies pursued by these countries have had – and
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will continue to have -- a major impact on world energy markets.
Because of their importance as consumers and importers of energy, moreover, the
participation of these five states has been and is likely to remain critical to meaningful
international cooperation to promote energy security among consumer countries. The first and
perhaps still the most important example of this was the creation in 1974 of the IEA, which
initially brought together the United States, most of Western European, and Japan as well as
Canada and Turkey. Over the years, the members of the European Union, including France,
Germany, and Britain after it joined in 1973, have also taken steps toward coordinating and
harmonizing their energy policies in ways that promote their energy security. Some more recent
international cooperative endeavors, such as the International Renewable Energy Association
(IRENA), have included a broader range of countries, but Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and
the United States have continued to play critical roles. Finally, as noted above, the principal
proposals for promoting international cooperation on energy security concern organizations – the
IEA, NATO, and the EU -- in which all or most of them are central actors.The article begins by
reviewing the oil-centric energy security concerns of the 1970s and how these five countries
responded to them, emphasizing the important differences in their responses and the limits on
their principal efforts at international cooperation to promote energy security via the IEA. In the
following section, it examines in detail the wider ranging energy security concerns and the even
more diverse preferred policy responses that have characterized Britain, France, Germany, Japan,
and the United States in the past decade. In the process, the article offers the first comparative
analysis of the energy security policies of these countries since energy security was last the focus
of much scholarly attention in the 1970s and early 1980s. A third section explores one of the
important implications of these differences, the prospects for international cooperation to
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promote energy security both among these states and with other import-dependent consumer
countries. A conclusion briefly summarizes the principal arguments and findings about the
differences between the 1970s and the past decade and the implications of the greater diversity of
energy security concerns and policy preferences in recent years for international efforts to
promote international cooperation on energy security.
Before proceeding, a note on the meaning of the term energy security as used here may be
in order. David Deese has usefully defined energy security as “a condition in which a nation
perceives a high probability that it will have adequate energy supplies at affordable prices.”2
Likewise, Daniel Yergin has written that “The objective of energy security is to assure adequate,
reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national
values and objectives.”3 What constitutes energy security for a particular country will depend
very much on the types of energy it consumes, where those sources of energy come from, and the
principal challenges that exist to their adequacy, reliability, and affordability. A number of
developments, both internal and external, can affect a country’s energy security. This article,
however, focuses on those concerns that emanate from a state’s dependence on foreign sources of
energy and domestic efforts to limit that dependence.

Energy Insecurity in the 1970s
The first great postwar era of energy insecurity in the developed democracies was
precipitated by the oil shocks of the 1970s. Correspondingly, the principal concerns of the time
revolved around oil, especially its affordability and its availability from foreign sources. In
response to the oil shocks, the advanced industrialized countries undertook a number of measures
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to reduce their oil consumption, to increase domestic production where possible, to ensure access
to foreign oil supplies where necessary, and to reduce their vulnerability to future oil supply
disruptions.
The policies adopted by the advanced industrialized countries in the 1970s did result in
improvements in their energy security. But their individual responses to the oil shocks were
rather varied and, partly as a result, their efforts at cooperation met with only limited success.4 A
further important consequence of these differences was a growing divergence in the energy
situations of these countries, such that their principal energy concerns and preferred policy
responses would be marked by increasing diversity in future years.
During the postwar years, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan became
increasingly dependent upon oil. In 1950, petroleum passed coal as the most important single
source of energy in the United States and by 1973, it accounted for more than 45 percent of U.S.
primary energy consumption (PEC).5 The shift in Western Europe and Japan, which had relied
more heavily on coal after World War II, was even more dramatic. By 1973, West Germany
used oil to meet 57 percent of its energy needs, France for more than two-thirds, and Japan for a
staggering 78 percent. And while the United States continued to produce a high if declining
percentage of the oil it used -- about 60 percent in 1973 -- virtually all of the petroleum
consumed in Western Europe and Japan was imported.6
Although a few analysts warned about the risks of the West’s growing appetite for oil,
governments did little or nothing to curb it.7 Indeed, some policies, such as price controls in the
United States, stimulated consumption. Consequently, all of these countries were hit hard when
the Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided in
October 1973 to reduce production and, with the support of the other OPEC members, to raise oil
5

prices, which nearly quadrupled by the end of the year. Although the simultaneous Arab oil
embargo had little effect, the sharp rise in prices was thought to wreak economic havoc, in the
form of sharply reduced growth, high inflation, increased unemployment, and payments
imbalances.8 Then, in the late 1970s, just as the advanced industrialized countries were
recovering from the first oil shock, they were hit by a second one. This time, the precipitating
event was a strike by Iranian oil workers, though it was largely panic buying by a variety of
market actors seeking to build up their stocks that caused the world price to more than double.
The oil shocks raised the issue of energy security to the top of the policy agenda in the
developed democracies, and during the 1970s and early 1980s, these countries faced a very
similar set of energy security challenges. The principal concern was the possibility of a major
disruption of oil supplies that could trigger a sharp increase in oil prices and possibly even fuel
shortages. Such a disruption might be intentional, as exemplified by the first oil shock, or it
might be the unintended result of an internal upheaval, as represented by the Iranian Revolution,
or of a regional conflict, a possibility raised in 1980 by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.
Consequently, the policy responses of the developed democracies to the oil shocks bore
important similarities. They all sought to reduce oil consumption through a variety of measures,
including efforts at conservation and improving energy efficiency as well as the promotion of
substitutes for oil, such as nuclear power, natural gas, and even coal. They also sought to
stabilize relations with the oil producing countries through various bilateral arrangements, while
making other efforts to diversify foreign oil supplies.9 And the period saw major attempts to
prepare for future emergencies through the buildup of strategic stockpiles of crude oil and
petroleum products, as exemplified by the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).10
At least as important as these similarities, however, were the differences in policy
6

responses. Most obviously, those who were able, mainly the United States and Great Britain
thanks to recent discoveries on Alaska’s North Slope and in the North Sea, sought to increase
domestic oil and gas production. Indeed, British oil output surpassed domestic demand in the
early 1980s, and British natural gas production sustained a steadily rising level of gas
consumption, which eventually exceeded oil as a share of Britain’s PEC.11
But significant variation also characterized the degree to which governments sought to
promote conservation and energy efficiency, especially with regard to the use of oil. West
Germany, for example, adopted a large number of conservation measures that, according to one
estimate, eventually resulted in savings of about 31 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE), or
about one-quarter of Germany’s oil consumption in the late 1980s.12 Japan, too, placed a high
priority on energy efficiency, substantially raising taxes on petroleum products and taking a
number of steps to promote conservation in the industrial sector, which accounted for as much as
two-thirds of Japanese energy consumption in 1973. Partly as a result of such efforts, Japan’s
energy intensity (total energy consumption divided by GDP) declined by one-third between 1973
and 1985.13
In contrast, efforts to reduce oil consumption in the United States were limited mainly to
the introduction of fuel economy standards for passenger cars and light trucks, the so-called
CAFE standards. Meanwhile, the U.S. government was slow to lift price controls on
domestically-produced oil, which artificially stimulated consumption. And perhaps most
significantly, it continued to maintain very low taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel, in contrast to
the much higher tax rates found in Japan and the West European states.14
Important differences also emerged in the development and promotion of alternatives to
oil. All the major industrialized countries experienced an upsurge of interest in nuclear power,
7

but the degree of emphasis varied considerably. France began an all-out effort to generate
electricity at nuclear plants.15 As a result, the percentage of French PEC attributable nuclear
power grew from less than two percent in 1973 to 17.6 percent in 1983 and 35.6 percent in 1993.
In the United States and Britain, in contrast, nuclear power’s share of PEC grew only slowly,
remaining below 10 percent for the next two decades. The first oil shock brought about at least a
temporary halt in coal’s slide as a share of PEC in Western Europe and Japan, but only in the
United States did coal see a significant increase, rising from just 18 percent of PEC in 1973 to 25
percent in the mid-1980s. In contrast, natural gas consumption as a share of PEC in the United
States continued the decline that had begun in 1970, while it exploded in Britain, doubling from
11 to 22 percent over the next decade, and grew steadily in Japan, thanks to shipments of
liquefied natural gas (LNG), and West Germany, which had just begun to import gas from the
Soviet Union and approved additional long-term contracts in the early 1980s.16
Thus, although overall energy consumption in 1985 was roughly the same as it had been
at the time of the first oil shock in all five countries, they had reduced their oil consumption by
widely varying degrees and had diversified their energy mixes in different ways. The most
dramatic change occurred in France, which saw oil use decline by one-third and oil’s share of
PEC by 25 percentage points. Britain also reduced oil consumption by more than 30 percent,
although this meant a much smaller drop as a percentage of PEC (12 points) because of the
country’s much lower initial level of oil dependence. In both Japan and West Germany, oil use
fell by nearly 25 percent, representing declines as a percentage of PEC of 21 and 14 points,
respectively. Bringing up the rear was the United States, which reduced oil consumption by just
12 percent, or five percentage points of PEC. Oil’s share of PEC was replaced mainly by natural
gas in Britain, nuclear power in France, and a combination of nuclear power and natural gas in
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West Germany and Japan.17
These different approaches were also reflected in the modest degree of cooperation to
promote energy security that took place among the major advanced industrialized democracies.
The biggest achievement was the creation by members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) of the IEA as a forum for coordinating their policies for
dealing with oil supply disruptions and, in the longer term, reducing oil dependence.
Headquartered in Paris near the OECD, the IEA did quickly establish an arrangement for sharing
oil supplies in the event of an emergency. But its members were much less successful at
developing meaningful measures for limiting oil consumption and imports. They agreed on longterm import targets but not on collective tools to implement them. The IEA also established a
floor on oil prices as a means of stimulating domestic oil production and the development of
alternative energy sources, but the price was set at too low a level, just $7 per barrel, to make any
difference.18 Also, France refused to join the organization, in part because it viewed the IEA as
excessively confrontational toward the oil producers.19
Even the IEA’s greatest achievement, the emergency oil sharing system, was revealed to
have significant limitations when first put to the test during the second oil shock of 1978-1979.
The system’s mandatory demand restraint and reallocation of oil supplies would only be
activated if one or more IEA members suffered a supply reduction of at least seven percent. Yet
it soon became clear that smaller reductions could have negative economic consequences,
especially if they generated substantial price increases. And when Sweden complained in 1979
of a much larger shortfall, the IEA declined to act, attributing the country’s problems to special
conditions.20
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Energy Insecurity in the 2000s
The worries about energy security precipitated by the oil shocks faded in the early 1980s
as the oil market softened due to stagnant global demand and growing production capacity. Oil
prices collapsed in 1985 and remained generally low for the next decade and a half. Thus energy
security did not re-emerge as a major concern in the developed democracies until the very end of
the 1990s or early 2000s, and this time, the issue arose more gradually than it had in the 1970s.
There was no single precipitating event comparable to the first oil shock. More significantly, the
definition of the problem has taken different forms in different countries in recent years. Energy
insecurity could no longer be defined simply as high oil prices and a heightened risk of oil supply
disruptions, and these differences in threat perception have in turn contributed to a still more
diverse set of national responses. To be sure, U.S. energy security policy has continued to be
primarily concerned with reducing oil consumption. But British policy has largely been about
managing the transition back to being a significant importer of oil and gas, France has confronted
the need to replace its aging stock of nuclear power plants, and Germany has had to address
uncertainty about the reliability of its imported natural gas supplies. Paradoxically, these
differences in energy security concerns and the resulting preferred policy responses were the
result in part of the policy choices made in the 1970s and pursued thereafter.

The United States: Plus Ça Change...
The U.S. energy security concerns of the 2000s have been the most similar to those of the
1970s, in part because United States had reduced its dependence on oil the least. Although
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domestic energy supplies have been disrupted on several occasions, the energy security issues
that have captured the most attention in the United States during the past decade have been the
high price of oil and petroleum products and the country’s dependence on oil imports. In late
2000, the cost of a barrel oil reached $30 for the first time since the Gulf War and only the
second time since the price collapse of the mid-1980s. Then after dropping briefly during the
following two years, the price of oil began a more or less steady rise that ultimately led to a
record high of nearly $150 per barrel in mid-2008, before dropping sharply.21
These price concerns were compounded by the negative consequences associated with the
United States’ importation of a large and growing share of its oil, which reached 60 percent in
the mid-2000s.22 With prices high, oil imports made a substantial contribution to America’s
towering trade deficit. Especially following September 11, 2001, concerns grew that money sent
abroad to pay for oil imports was being used to finance anti-American terrorist activity. And
substantial oil revenues helped to empower regimes, such as those in Venezuela and Iran, that
were hostile to American interests.23
The U.S. responses to these renewed concerns about energy security unfolded over a
number of years. In 2001, the new Bush administration prepared a “National Energy Policy” that
identified the twin problems of high energy prices and growing imports, but it resulted in few
concrete actions.24 Rather, it was not until the middle of the decade that the government passed
significant pieces of legislation intended to promote energy security, although President Bush did
direct his administration to fill the SPR to its full capacity of 727 million barrels following the
September 11 attacks. The 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPACT) was the first major energy-related
legislation of any kind since the early 1990s, and it was soon followed by the even more farreaching Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
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Together, the two acts contained a number of specific measures designed to combat the
negative consequences of America’s oil dependence in general and its growing reliance on oil
imports in particular.25 To mitigate the effects of possible future oil supply disruptions, the 2005
law provided for expanding the capacity of the SPR to one billion barrels. In the area of
conservation, the 2005 act contained tax credits for the purchase of hybrid vehicles, while the
2007 act raised fuel economy standards for passenger cars and light trucks from an average of 25
miles per gallon (mpg) to 35 mpg by 2020, the first statutory increase since they had been
established in 1975. Since 2009, the Obama administration has accelerated the introduction of
tougher fuel economy standards and sought to extend them to heavier vehicles. In the area of
alternative transportation fuels, the 2005 act mandated the production of an increasing amount of
ethanol, up to 7.5 billion gallons (four to five percent of gasoline demand) in 2012, while the
2007 act established an even more ambitious renewable fuels standard that would require the
inclusion of at least 36 billion gallons of ethanol and other biofuels in the fuel supply by 2022.
The 2005 act also included several strong incentives for building new nuclear power plants, but
these provisions were not intended to reduce U.S. oil dependence.
Just as important as these measures was what the new energy policy legislation did not
attempt to do to reduce oil consumption and imports. Perhaps most notably, it provided for no
increase in the traditionally low U.S. taxes on motor fuels, even though it is these low taxes that
make American consumers uniquely sensitive to oil price spikes. Although economists argue
that higher fuel taxes would be the most efficient way to reduce oil consumption, the federal
gasoline tax has been frozen at 18.4 cents per gallon since 1993, and it is lower in real terms than
it was before the first oil shock.26 In addition, questions could be raised about the sufficiency of
the increased fuel economy and renewable fuels requirements. According to one favorable
12

estimate, the combined effect of the improved gas mileage and the alternative fuels mandate
would be to reduce oil consumption by more than four million barrels per day by 2030.27 At the
time, however, the government’s influential Energy Information Agency (EIA) projected that oil
consumption would increase by an even larger amount under business-as-usual assumptions,
suggesting that these measures would not likely result in any net reduction.28
In recent years, there has been much debate over reducing federal restrictions on domestic
oil production. The Bush administration made lifting these restrictions a high priority, although
it was unable to overcome Congressional resistance, and even the Obama administration has
proposed opening up substantial offshore areas to exploration and drilling.29 Nevertheless, while
the increases in domestic oil production that could be achieved in this way would reduce imports
by a roughly equivalent amount, they would not greatly increase U.S. energy security. In
particular, output levels would not be sufficient to bring down world oil prices significantly, and
increased domestic production would not make the U.S. economy much less vulnerability to the
price increases that would inevitably follow a substantial supply disruption elsewhere in the
world.30
Since 2009, energy policy legislative efforts have focused on the creation of a cap-andtrade system for carbon emissions. Although such a system might help to limit climate change,
its implications for U.S. energy security are unclear and potentially negligible. Indeed, the bill
passed by the House of Representatives in 2009 contained no provisions explicitly aimed at
reducing oil consumption.31

Britain: From Fossil Fuel Exporter to Importer
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In Britain, in contrast, renewed concern about energy security has been the result
foremost of declining domestic production of oil and natural gas in the North Sea. During most
of the 1980s and 1990s, Britain had been a net exporter of oil, and its gas production had met
most domestic demand. Around the year 2000, however, production of both oil and gas peaked
and then began a rapid decline that appeared irreversible.32
The situation was particularly acute with regard to natural gas, on which the country had
become increasingly dependent; as a share of PEC, it had grown from 11 percent in 1973 to
nearly 40 percent. Britain could readily import additional oil from foreign sources. Not so with
gas, which requires expensive undersea pipelines or LNG terminals. As a result, Britain has
come the closest to experiencing an acute energy crisis comparable to the oil shocks of the 1970s.
During the winter of 2005-2006, British consumers faced the real prospect of gas shortages as
demand outstripped domestic production, British gas suppliers were unable to make up the
difference from stocks or imports, and the government considered imposing mandatory
restrictions on consumption.33 A serious crisis was narrowly averted, but the close call drove
home the fact that Britain had made a rapid transition from being a net exporter to a net importer
of natural gas and that more would have to be done to ensure that demand could be met
increasingly from foreign sources. Indeed, the government estimated that Britain could depend
on imports for as much as 90 percent of its gas needs by 2020, and an increasing share of these
imports would necessarily come from unstable regions.34
A related but longer-term energy security challenge facing Britain was the aging of its
nuclear power plants. Most of the 23 reactors operating in the early 2000s were due to be shut
down by 2020. Although they accounted for only about one-fifth of British electricity
production, their loss would cause the UK to rely even more heavily on gas-fired power
14

generation and thus further increase Britain’s dependence on gas imports.35
Through the middle of the decade, British energy policy had focused largely on the
problem of climate change and had placed primary emphasis on reducing carbon emissions.36
Thus the British policy response to the renewed concerns about energy security only began to
emerge in 2006 with the publication of the Energy Review Report and then was fleshed out in the
2007 Energy White Paper, the Energy Bill that was put forward in January 2008, and the 2008
White Paper on Nuclear Power.37 A central thrust of the new policy was to ensure reliable access
to supplies of natural gas and oil and to encourage the production of substitutes. The government
sought to facilitate the creation of adequate natural gas import and storage facilities by
strengthening and simplifying the existing regulatory framework. In addition, it increased the
obligations already established for renewable sources of energy in order to reduce the need for oil
and natural gas. The government set a goal of quintupling the amount of electricity supplied by
renewables from around four percent in 2005 to 20 percent by 2015.38
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the new British energy policy was its embrace of
nuclear power. As recently as 2003, the government had minimized the need to replace the
country’s aging reactors, describing it as an “unattractive option” on economic grounds and
because of the unresolved issue of nuclear waste disposal.39 In a sharp turnaround just a few
years later, however, the government declared that it would take a number of actions to reduce
regulatory and planning risks associated with private investment in new nuclear power stations.40
Britain has complemented these domestic initiatives with strong support for EU policies
that would help to improve its energy security.41 Britain has been a leading proponent of
completing the internal EU energy market through the adoption of further liberalization measures
and the creation of more physical interconnections between national electricity and gas
15

infrastructures. It has strongly advocated the diversification of EU natural gas supplies through
such measures as the construction of a new pipeline connecting Central Europe to the gas
resources Caspian region and potentially the Persian Gulf. And it has favored giving central EU
bodies greater authority to act on behalf of EU members on energy issues in relations with third
parties. Whether these efforts would bear fruit, however, would depend on the policy
preferences of its EU partners, especially Germany and France.

Germany: Can It Count on Russian Gas?
In Germany, concerns about energy security also came abruptly to the fore in the mid2000s. As in Britain, moreover, they revolved primarily around the country’s dependence on
imports of natural gas, although the specific sources of those concerns were different. Following
the oil shocks, Germany had successfully limited oil consumption, but its use of natural gas had
grown more or less steadily since the early 1970s and had continued to increase after unification,
both in absolute terms – from 54 MTOE in 1990 to more than 77 MTOE in 2005 – and as a share
of PEC – from 15.4 percent to 24 percent over the same time period.42 Meanwhile, domestic gas
production was stagnant, meaning that Germany relied on imports to meet more than 80 percent
of demand.43 Of even greater concern was the fact the Germany received about 37 percent of its
natural gas from Russia, thanks to pipelines built in the 1970s and 1980s, and that based on
existing trends, this figure was expected to rise to as high as 70 percent by 2020. Because almost
all of Germany’s natural gas arrived via fixed pipelines, moreover, it could not be very easily
replaced in the event of a supply disruption.44
Initially, however, German leaders evinced little concern. At the beginning of the 2000s,
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the left-of-center Red-Green coalition had agreed to phase-out within two decades nuclear power,
one of the principal means on which West Germany had relied to reduce its oil dependence. The
nuclear phase-out was likely to result in even greater demand for natural gas in order to replace
the approximately 30 percent of electricity production then accounted for by nuclear power.45
And in 2005, the German government backed an agreement by German and Russian companies
to build a new gas pipeline that would directly link the two countries via the Baltic Sea.46
Thus it required the January 2006 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine to propel
energy security to the top of the political agenda. The decision by the Russian natural gas
concern Gazprom to cut off supplies to Ukraine over an unresolved commercial dispute called
into question Russia’s reliability as an energy supplier. Although the recently elected Black-Red
coalition government had already decided to conduct a comprehensive review of energy policy,
the gas crisis gave considerable impetus to the process.47
The energy policy review culminated in the adoption of an Integrated Energy and Climate
Program (IECP) in the second half of 2007. The IECP included 29 separate measures primarily
aimed at increasing energy efficiency and the use of renewable forms of energy that could reduce
Germany’s dependence on natural gas imports. When fully implemented in 2020, these
measures were expected to increase the contributions of renewable energy to electricity
production from 13 percent to 25-30 percent, to increase the share of electricity produced from
efficient combined heat and power (CHP) from 12 to 25 percent, and to reduce energy use in new
buildings by 30 percent, among other things.48
As ambitious as the program may have been, however, it appeared to place much more
emphasis on fighting climate change than on enhancing Germany’s energy security. Although
greater energy efficiency and the use of renewables could reduce energy imports, the program
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contained few if any measures primarily intended to address Germany’s dependence on imported
natural gas per se. For example, it contained no measures to diversify the sources of Germany’s
natural gas imports, nor was there any discussion of the possible contribution of nuclear power to
energy security. By late 2007, the concerns about energy security that had initially animated the
review process had largely subsided.49
A further boost was provided by an even more serious Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in early
2009, which resulted in gas delivery shortfalls of as much as 60 percent in southern Germany and
of 10-15 percent in the country as a whole.50 That, plus continuing concerns about climate
change and the election of a new center-right coalition government in September 2009, set the
stage for a further review of energy policy the following year. The resulting 2010 Energy
Concept established an even more ambitious goal for renewable electricity – 35 percent by 2020
– and called for reducing PEC by 20 percent over the same period. In sharp contrast to the IECP,
moreover, it called for slowing the long-planned nuclear phase-out, extending the operating lives
of Germany’s nuclear power plants by an average of 12 years.51
Nevertheless, the new concept, like the IECP before it, played down Germany’s
dependence on imported gas and the energy security risks it posed, emphasizing instead the
potential contributions to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and fighting climate change. More
seriously, there were grounds for questioning how realistic the targets for reductions in energy
consumption and increases renewable energy were and thus what contribution the relevant
measures could make to German energy security. In the run up to the IECP, for example,
government officials were deeply divided over whether Germany could generate even 30 percent
of its electricity from renewables by 2020.52 And the scenarios on which the 2010 concept was
based depended on a series of ambitious assumptions about technological innovation and
18

international cooperation in the fight against climate change.53 If Germany fell short of its targets
in any of these areas, the demand for natural gas and natural gas imports would almost certainly
be much higher than projected. To make matters worse, the government abruptly reversed its
position on nuclear power in mid-2011 following the disaster at Fukushima Daichi in Japan,
quickly shutting down Germany’s eight oldest reactors and restoring the goal of phasing out the
rest by 2022. Thus it appeared that Germany would continue to place considerable faith in the
reliability and adequacy of its existing sources of natural gas imports, especially Russia.

France: Nuclear Power and Its Discontents
In Western Europe, France has been most consistently attentive to the issue of energy
security since the oil shocks, given its even more limited fossil fuel resources. Nevertheless,
concerns about energy security have been least acute in France in recent years, thanks in large
part to its heavy investment in nuclear power following the oil shocks. By the early 2000s,
domestically produced nuclear energy and hydroelectric power accounted for nearly 45 percent of
France’s PEC. In contrast, it boasted the lowest level of oil dependence (just over 35 percent of
PEC) and the second lowest share of PEC from natural gas (approximately 15 percent) of the five
major developed democracies.54 In addition, France’s foreign sources of natural gas were among
the most diverse, making it less vulnerable to a major supply disruption.55
Energy security worries have not been entirely absent, however. By the middle of the
decade, French officials had begun to voice concern about the high and rapidly rising cost of
energy imports, which roughly doubled between 2003 and 2006. Indeed, in May 2006, then
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin spoke of a “petroleum crisis.”56 That year, the net cost of
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energy imports reached 46 billion euros, just short of the all-time high of just over 50 billion
euros in 1981, and the bill would have been higher but for France’s export of nuclear
electricity.57
Of even greater concern was the aging of France’s nuclear power plants. Of the 59 plants
in operation in the mid-2000s, all but four had commenced commercial operation between the
late 1970s and the early 1990s. Assuming a 40-year lifetime, replacements would have to begin
to come on line between 2015 and 2020.58 Although the lifetimes could potentially be extended
to as much as 55 years, there was little time to lose in determining how France’s future electricity
needs would be met, given the long lead times for power plant construction.
A major review of energy policy began in 2002, even before the Iraq war and the
subsequent run up in world oil prices. This timing reflected the longer view of French concerns
about energy security. The process culminated with the publication of a White Paper (Livre
blanc) in late 2003 and the adoption of a major energy policy act (Loi d’orientation) in July
2005.59
The new French energy policy established a number of ambitious goals aimed at
addressing the renewed concerns about energy security. By 2010, France would seek to reduce
its energy imports (two-third of which were oil) by 10 MTOE, or more than 10 percent, and to
increase the use of biofuels from almost nothing to seven percent of fuel consumption. Over the
longer term, France would seek to slow the growth of electricity consumption, by improving
energy efficiency, by two percent per year until 2015 and then by 2.5 percent per year thereafter,
and to more than double the amount of electricity generated from renewable sources by 2020.60
To achieve these goals, the government introduced a system of energy saving (white) certificates,
which obligated energy suppliers to achieve savings by their customers, and it increased
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significantly the feed-in tariffs that power companies were required to pay for electricity from
renewable sources.61
Most significantly, the government renewed its commitment to maintaining heavy
reliance on nuclear power. In 2006, the state-controlled Électricité de France (EDF) approved,
for the first time in more than a decade, the construction of a new reactor, which was expected to
be completed in 2012, and three years later, the government confirmed that EDF would build a
second one. These reactors would be of a new design, the so-called European Pressurized Water
Reactor (EPR), with the goal being to decide by 2015 whether to build as many of 40 of them.
Also in 2006, the French Atomic Energy Committee began the process of designing the prototype
for a fourth generation reactor, which was expected to become operational as early as 2020.62
Finally, the government initiated discussions about extending the lifetimes of the existing power
plants beyond 40 years, a move that would require approval by the independent Nuclear Safety
Authority.63

Japan: Multidimensional Insecurity
Traditionally, concerns about energy security have been most acute in Japan, given the
country’s very limited indigenous energy resources and its isolated geographical position. And in
the 2000s, the issue “returned to the top of the political agenda in Japan.”64 Despite considerable
efforts in the 1970s, Japan had been able to do little to reduce its fundamental vulnerability.
Although the country’s oil dependence had declined substantially, oil still accounted for half of
all PEC. Moreover, nearly 90 percent of Japan’s oil still came from a single region, the Middle
East, with much of that having to pass through the narrow Straits of Hormuz.65 As the decade
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wore on, these long-standing oil security concerns were heightened by the rising price of oil and
the seemingly increased potential for supply disruptions due to instability in the Persian Gulf and
other oil-producing regions.66 Concerns about the supply of natural gas were somewhat less
acute, but still significant. Japan is almost entirely dependent on gas imports, and although the
sources of these imports are diverse, with less than one-quarter coming from the Persian Gulf,
they have not been immune to disruptions.
These long-standing worries about the security of energy supplies have been heightened
by two other recent trends. One is intensified competition and conflict over regional energy
sources, such as those located in Russia and the East China Sea, as a result of rapidly growing
demand for oil and natural gas in China, India, and elsewhere.67 And because the countries of
East Asia obtain their imports from many of the same sources, a future supply disruption could
trigger an intense scramble for access to whatever supplies remain. Further compounding the
problem has been a resurgence of resource nationalism among energy suppliers.68 This trend
posed a direct challenge to Japan’s traditional policy of attempting to secure resources through
direct investments in overseas energy development projects.69
Perhaps because of the intensity with which concerns about energy security are felt,
Japan’s policy responses have been potentially the most wide-ranging and far-reaching. The
basic long-term goals of Japanese energy security policy were first set forth in a “New National
Energy Strategy” made public by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) in May
2006. Most importantly, the strategy called for further reducing oil’s share of PEC to less than
40 percent by 2030. To do so, Japan would seek to increase its already high level of energy
efficiency by another 30 percent over the 2003 level. It would stimulate the introduction of solar
power, wind power, and biomass energy through various subsidies, tax incentives, and
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production requirements. And it would reduce the near total oil dependence of the transportation
sector to 80 percent by promoting greater fuel efficiency and encouraging the use of electric
vehicles, fuel cells, and biofuels.70 A related measure would be to maintain nuclear power’s
share of electricity generation at the existing 30 percent and possibly to increase it to 40 percent
or more by 2030. To this end, the government would seek to raise the capacity utilization of
existing nuclear power plants and promote the construction of new ones.
In the international sphere, the government would play a much more prominent role.71
According to the new strategy, the share of imported oil produced by Japanese companies should
rise from 15 percent to 40 percent by 2030. To this end, the government would provide more
“risk money” to encourage oil and gas exploration overseas by Japanese companies, and it would
reinforce its diplomatic activities in the area of energy resources with the strategic use of
overseas development assistance.72 At the same time, Japan would make efforts to dampen
regional competition for energy resources by working with other Asian countries to promote
energy conservation and efficiency, to increase domestic energy production and develop
alternative energy sources, and to improve emergency preparedness through the establishment of
adequate petroleum stockpiles and emergency response systems.73
A 2010 revision of Japan’s Basic Energy Plan by the new government headed by the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) established even more ambitious and more detailed goals. It
called for reducing oil’s share of the primary energy supply to just 28 percent by 2030 and cutting
oil consumption by more than 40 percent. Imports of natural gas would be reduced by lesser but
still significant amounts. Meanwhile, the amount of energy provided by nuclear power would
more than double, partly through the construction of 14 new nuclear plants. And total renewable
energy generating capacity would increase by more than 130 percent.74
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Given the ambitious nature of these plans, there were solid grounds for doubting their
feasibility.75 But by 2011, the government had taken a number of concrete steps to implement
the new strategy. It extended the Energy Conservation Law to cover a much broader range of
businesses and raised the already high fuel economy standards for passenger cars to nearly 44
mpg by 2015. It established a feed-in tariff for power generated by photovoltaics and was
considering extending the tariff to other small renewable sources of electricity. And it increased
the amount of financing available for Japanese energy companies engaged in exploration and
development projects overseas.
A principal limitation of these efforts was the difficulty the government continued to face
in overcoming local resistance to the construction of new nuclear facilities and to reopening
existing plants that had been temporarily shutdown out of safety considerations. Then, the 2011
crisis at the Fukushima Daichi power plant required the government not only to scrap its plans
for increasing nuclear energy’s share of electricity production but to contemplate a future in
which electricity generated by nuclear power would be sharply curtailed.76 During the following
months, the government sought to craft programs for further encouraging the development of
renewable sources of electricity, even as the country had to rely more heavily on fossil fuel-fired
generating capacity in the short to medium term.77

Implications for International Cooperation
These national concerns and the resulting policies have a number of implications. Most
obviously, they will affect the degree of energy security achieved by each of these countries. In
some cases, they will also affect relations between these states and energy exporting countries.
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This final section, however, will focus on how these cross-national differences in threat
perception and preferred policy responses will affect the prospects for international cooperation
to promote energy security both among these countries and with other import-dependent
consumer countries. Just as in the 1970s, the recent re-emergence of concerns about energy
security has spawned a number of proposals for collective action. Most of these have concerned
existing international organizations, chiefly the IEA, NATO, and the EU. While some
international agreements may be reached to promote energy security, this analysis suggests that
progress will be slow and extremely limited. The differences in national concerns, policy
preferences, and constraints will place sharp limits on what can be accomplished.

Global Cooperation in the International Energy Agency
The IEA remains the principal international organization devoted exclusively to energy
issues. Indeed, both its membership and its functions have expanded over the years. The
organization now includes Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States as well as 23
other advanced industrialized countries, and increasingly, IEA has played an important role in
conducting research and analysis and publishing information on energy policies, markets,
technologies, and other issues. Perhaps most importantly, however, the IEA continues to promote
the energy security of its members through a variety of provisions intended to minimize the
impact of oil supply disruptions and to facilitate a collective response to them. In particular, it
requires members to maintain oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of imports and as well as
plans for releasing those stocks, restraining demand, fuel switching, increasing domestic
production, and, if necessary, sharing oil supplies in the event of a major oil supply disruption.
Over the years, the organization has sought to increase the flexibility of these emergency
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response arrangements, and they have been used on several occasions to alleviate actual
shortages and to reassure market actors that significant shortages would not develop. Thus one
might expect the IEA to be a logical and perhaps the most useful forum for the development of
common approaches to the problem of energy insecurity. Yet the organization has seen little new
activity in this regard.
In fact, the IEA’s potential to address the current energy security concerns of its members
is quite limited. One reason is the organization’s traditional focus on the problems associated
with dependence on oil, reflecting the circumstances of its birth. The IEA still maintains an
emergency oil sharing system as well as an information system on the international oil market
that can help to provide prompt warning of supply problems. But as the energy security concerns
of its members have shifted from oil to other energy sources, such as natural gas and nuclear
power, where the IEA has had much less of a formal role to play, the organization has become
less relevant. As Jeffrey Colgan notes, “the organization’s basic structure and procedures have
remained frozen in time since its creation even as geopolitical circumstances have changed…”78
At the same time, the capacity of the IEA to blunt the negative consequences of even an
oil supply disruption has declined due to the growth of demand in developing countries such as
China and India. Although the number of IEA members has increased over the years – even
France joined in 1992 – they now account for just over half of global oil consumption, as
compared to more than 60 percent when the organization was created.79 To remedy this
situation, some, including the IEA’s Executive Director, have proposed bringing China, India,
and perhaps other developing countries into the organization so that they can participate in the
emergency oil sharing system.80 At least three obstacles must be overcome before the IEA could
be usefully expanded, however. First, membership in the IEA remains restricted to members of
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the OECD, and it is likely to be some time before China, India, and others are able or willing to
join the latter organization, given its expectation that members exhibit open market economies,
democratic pluralism, and respect for human rights.
Second, China and India may have little interest in joining the IEA itself. They and other
developing countries are already able to benefit from the efforts of the current IEA members
without having to bear any of the financial costs of membership. In addition, they may be
unwilling to pay the sovereignty costs associated with meeting the IEA’s information sharing and
disclosure requirements. Thus unless the agreement establishing the IEA is amended to allow
non-OECD members and new members are willing to release sensitive data regarding their
stockpiles, meaningful participation in the emergency sharing system will be precluded.81
Third, China, India, and other developing countries have relatively little to contribute to
the system, at least in the near term. India’s strategic petroleum reserve amounts to at most 37.4
million barrels, or less than three weeks of imports. China established a strategic oil reserve of
100 million barrels in 2008, is in the process of completing a second phase that will add another
170 million barrels of capacity, and has plans for 200 million more barrels by 2020. But the
roughly 200 million barrels accumulated so far amount to just 40 days of Chinese oil imports,
still well below the IEA requirement that members maintain emergency reserves equal to 90 days
of imports.82 In contrast, nearby Japan, which now imports less oil than does China, directly
controls about 320 million barrels of reserves and requires private companies to maintain an
additional 70 days of supply.83

Energy Security and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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Thus more prominent than anything that has occurred within the IEA have been recent
proposals to assign NATO new responsibilities in the field of energy security. In early 2006,
shortly after the first Russia-Ukraine gas conflict, Poland reportedly proposed that member
countries be obliged to help each other during an energy crisis, and former NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for putting the issue of energy security on the alliance’s
agenda.84 Later that year, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, the foremost congressional authority on
energy issues, argued that NATO should formally adopt energy security as one of its central
missions and that the alliance must prepare for and respond to attempts to use the energy weapon
against its members under Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty.85 Lugar also sponsored a
Senate resolution that called upon the President to raise the issue of establishing a NATO energy
security strategy.86 And at its Riga Summit in November 2006, the North Atlantic Council
agreed to work toward defining “those areas where NATO may add value to safeguard the
[energy] security interests of the Allies and, upon request, assist national and international
efforts.”87
Beyond resupplying a member threatened with or suffering from a cutoff of energy
supplies, a number of other specific roles for NATO have been suggested. Lugar, for example,
has proposed holding high level consultations between NATO and Russia on energy security,
developing strategic partnerships with other energy exporters, and providing diplomatic and
economic support for alternative energy routes from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Likewise, a
high level NATO official has identified four possible areas of NATO involvement: monitoring
and assessment of the energy security situation, the provision of security assistance to allies,
maritime surveillance to deter attacks against important energy assets, and military operations to
secure the supply of oil or gas in an actual crisis or conflict situation.88 And in addition to the
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adoption of an explicit NATO solidarity clause in the event of threats to energy security, Poland
reportedly proposed the creation of common oil and natural gas reserves.89
Thus far, however, most of the ideas for using NATO to promote energy security have
originated either in the United States or at the alliance’s headquarters. In contrast, other than
Poland, the European members of the alliance, including Britain, France, and Germany, have
exhibited little or no enthusiasm for the concept. France has traditionally been cool toward any
proposals to expand the responsibilities of NATO. But even the more Atlanticist German
government has preferred to address energy security in the context of EU-US relations or in the
broader framework of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) rather
than through NATO.90 And the British government, traditionally the most pro-NATO of the
three, made no reference to the alliance in the series of major statements on energy policy that it
has issued in recent years.91
There are several overlapping reasons for the tepid European response. First, many of the
proposals do not address the principal European energy security concerns, or at least do not offer
much of a solution to them. NATO’s comparative advantage lies in the area of ensuring the
reliable delivery of oil and natural gas by sea from distant sources. In contrast, many European
concerns revolve around the adequacy and reliability of regional energy infrastructure (natural
gas pipelines, import terminals, and storage facilities; nuclear power plants, etc.). Second, many
Europeans would prefer to emphasize political and economic measures for enhancing energy
security, whereas many of the proposals for using NATO seek to exploit the alliance’s military
capabilities.92 By the same token, Europeans fear that an increased role for NATO could be
counterproductive, especially in dealing with Russia, given the alliance’s strong association with
the cold war and military approaches to security.93 Finally, some of the proposed functions, such
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as those involving intelligence and diplomacy, are already handled or, in the view of many
Europeans, might be better handled by other bodies. As even de Hoop Scheffer noted, “I am not
suggesting that NATO should be the place where decisions are taken on where the next pipelines
should be constructed, nor that NATO would be the first responder in an energy crisis situation –
I acknowledge that other international organisations are better suited for those tasks.”94
Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of these European reactions, there have no significant
developments within NATO since the initial proposals were made. At an April 2008 summit in
Bucharest, NATO leaders noted a report on “NATO’s Role in Energy Security” that identified
principles that would govern NATO’s approach in this field and outlined options and
recommendations for further activities. Based on these principles, the members agreed on five
specific areas where further NATO engagement was deemed desirable: information and
intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional
cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical
energy infrastructure. The alliance would also continue to consult on the most immediate risks in
the field of energy security.95 Since then, work on implementing this decision has gone on
quietly behind the scenes, as noted in semi-annual declarations and communiques issued by the
North Atlantic Council. But prominent public discussion of the issue within the alliance has died
down, and there is no evidence that NATO has yet taken any important practical steps to enhance
the energy security of its members. The subject received just two paragraphs and one very
general recommendation in the 47-page report issued by the Group of Experts in May 2010,96
and the new strategic concept adopted in November 2010 simply states that NATO will “develop
the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure
and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the
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basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning.”97

Cooperation for Energy Security in the European Union98
Instead, for the major European states, at least, the most promising forum for multilateral
cooperation to promote energy security has been the European Union. Energy policy per se was
not a formal area of EU competence until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in late 2009.
Nevertheless, the organization has in recent years proposed or adopted a number of measures
that, directly or indirectly, would enhance the energy security of its member states.
As early as 2000, the European Commission published a “Green Paper” that raised
concerns about the security of the EU’s energy supplies and suggested a general strategy for
addressing the problems it identified.99 Although this initiative yielded no concrete results, the
goal of energy security was a central element of subsequent efforts to fashion a more
comprehensive energy policy. In early 2006, at the invitation of the national leaders, the
Commission prepared another Green Paper that laid out a general “European Strategy for
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy.”100 The following year, the Commission presented
a more detailed action plan titled “Energy Policy for Europe” that was adopted by the heads of
government that March.101 The action plan, like the Green Paper, placed equal emphasis on the
goals of economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability, and security of energy supplies,
but went beyond it to establish ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
increasing the share of renewable energy in the EU’s overall energy mix, and raising overall
energy efficiency in the EU all by 20 percent by 2020. Then based on the action plan, the
Commission developed an “energy and climate package” of more specific measures designed to
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achieve those goals.
Some proposed measures have been specifically intended to increase the energy security
of the EU. One set of measures would establish a coherent external energy policy whereby the
EU could “speak with one voice” on international energy issues and integrate energy into other
policies with an external dimension. Of particular interest here, of course, are relations with
Russia and other key energy producers and transit countries as well as support for the creation of
new infrastructure for bringing energy to Europe. Another set of steps, which have seemed
especially urgent in the wake of the two conflicts over natural gas between Russia and Ukraine,
would create a more effective system for dealing with disruptions in natural gas supplies,
including more gas storage, strategic stockpiles, and adequate pipeline capacity for moving gas
wherever it might be needed in a crisis.
Other energy policy measures that have been proposed or adopted by the EU so far, even
though intended primarily to promote low energy prices or fight climate change, would also
contribute to greater energy security. For example, full liberalization and integration of the
members’ gas and electricity markets would add flexibility and increase the resilience of the EU
energy system as a whole. Raising the share of renewable sources in the energy mix and
increasing energy efficiency would reduce demand for imports of oil and gas.
Despite all this activity, progress toward the goal of increasing the energy security of the
EU has been slow, and the prospects for significant advances in this area remain uncertain. One
problem is that some important energy policy initiatives will do little to promote energy security
or could even exacerbate the situation. For example, the much touted Emissions Trading
System, by raising the cost of carbon emissions, could make natural gas relatively more attractive
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than coal and thus aggravate the region’s import dependence.102
More fundamentally, even within the highly integrated EU, energy policy continues to be
an area where national prerogatives are carefully guarded. The new article on energy contained
in the Lisbon Treaty concludes that measures to achieve common objectives “shall not affect a
Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply...”103 This
constraint might not be so problematic if the members states had similar policy preferences. But
on many particular issues, the positions of Britain, France, and Germany, not to mention some
other member states, have often been far apart.104
One area of disagreement has been the completion of the internal electricity and gas
markets. Britain has been a leading proponent, while France and Germany have resisted critical
proposals, such as “unbundling” the ownership of energy supplies and transmission networks.105
Another point of contention has been the future role of nuclear power, which could greatly
reduce the EU’s dependence on imports of natural gas. Yet here the EU lacks a common policy,
with each country instead insisting on its unrestricted right to expand, reduce, or simply maintain
its nuclear program at its current level regardless of the overall implications for the union. In this
case, France and increasingly Britain have been strong proponents of building new power plants,
while Germany has planned to phase out nuclear power.106
Issues dealing more directly with energy security have been marked by no more comity.
Britain has strongly endorsed the idea of establishing a common external energy policy.
Although the advantages of a collective approach to such endeavors as negotiating access to
energy markets and facilitating the construction of expensive infrastructure like pipelines may
seem compelling, Germany and France have continued to back bilateral agreements between
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their energy companies and Russian counterparts.107 Disagreement has also persisted over what
common measures are needed to ensure security of gas supply. For example, Germany, which
maintains substantial gas storage facilities, has been concerned lest countries that do not already
stockpile gas seek to free ride on its emergency preparations.108
Thus even within the highly integrated EU, substantial obstacles stand in the way of
collective efforts to increase energy security. Divergent policy preferences have made it difficult
to create a united front. And even if the EU is able to make significant progress, its success will
do little the enhance the energy security of many other developed democracies, led by the United
States and Japan.

Conclusion
After years of absence, energy security returned as a prominent policy issue in the first
years of the 21st century. Indeed, during the past decade, concerns about energy security in the
largest developed democracies – Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States -- have
reached levels not seen since the 1970s and early 1980s. In several important respects, however,
the recent era of heightened energy insecurity is quite different from the previous one.
In the first place, the recent concerns about energy security are much more diverse than
they were in 1970s. Then, it was largely a matter of high oil prices and uncertain oil supplies for
all the developed democracies. Now, in addition to oil, important sources of insecurity are
dependence on imports of other fuels, notably natural gas, and the viability of nuclear power
programs. For example, Britain has faced the challenge of transitioning from being a net
importer of petroleum and especially natural gas to being a net importer. In France, attention has
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focused on the country’s aging nuclear infrastructure, which was built largely to reduce France’s
dependence on foreign oil. In Germany, meanwhile, concerns have revolved around the
dependence on foreign sources of natural gas, especially from Russia, exacerbated by sharp
domestic constraints on continued reliance on nuclear power. Japan’s energy security worries
have been most diverse, given that country’s extreme lack of energy resources. Only in the
United States have the recent concerns mainly revolved around oil.
This diversity of energy security concerns owes in no small part to the different policies
pursued by these countries in response to the oil shocks of the 1970s. Britain encouraged the
rapid exploitation of the recently discovered reserves of oil and gas in the North Sea. France
undertook the world’s most ambitious nuclear power program, which would eventually provide
some 40 percent of its PEC. The German government promoted the diversification of the
country’s energy mix and the sources of its fossil fuel imports, including the construction of
natural gas pipelines connecting Western Europe to the Soviet Union. Arguably, the United
States made the most limited efforts to reduce its dependence on oil.
Not surprisingly, these more recent differences in national definitions of the problem have
contributed in turn to rather varied policy responses In Britain, government policy has sought to
promote the construction of natural gas import facilities and new nuclear power plants that would
reduce the need for gas in electricity production. France has renewed its commitment to nuclear
power, while German policy has emphasized achieving ever greater levels of energy efficiency
and renewable sources of electric power. Japanese policy has called for progress on numerous
fronts, including energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear power, and gaining greater access
to overseas oil supplies by Japanese companies. Only in the United States has the principal
emphasis once again been on reducing oil consumption through greater fuel economy and
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developing substitutes for petroleum products.
Finally, these differences have significant implications for cooperative efforts to improve
energy security. One important response to the oil shocks was the creation of the International
Energy Agency. But even the IEA has played only a relatively minor role compared with
national efforts in enhancing the energy security of its members. Today, the prospects for
significant multilateral approaches to promote energy security seem even more limited. With the
possible exception of the European Union, divergent national concerns and policy preferences
will make meaningful collective responses difficult, if not impossible, to orchestrate. The
usefulness of the IEA is likely to remain limited to addressing concerns about oil supply
disruptions, and even there its capacity to respond effectively is increasingly constrained by
rising oil consumption in non-member developing countries. NATO’s role in promoting energy
security is likely to remain even more marginal because of differing member views about its
relevance to addressing today’s energy security concerns. And even within the EU, substantial
obstacles remain before that body can respond in a unified way to the recent energy security
challenges faced by its members. Overall, international cooperation to promote energy security
is likely to be even more limited than it was in the 1970s.
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